From ad34f70f9ce87b23eb255e833e24c447854d675b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thibaut Horel Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 18:39:58 -0500 Subject: End --- project/main.tex | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/project/main.tex b/project/main.tex index c921c1e..586be36 100644 --- a/project/main.tex +++ b/project/main.tex @@ -67,14 +67,14 @@ make some assumptions on the behaviors of the agents. Finding the right behavioral axioms is part of the project, but we list a few natural candidates that we are planning to consider: \begin{itemize} - \item each bidder not only has a utility function that expresses his utility at the - end of the auction, but also maintains a distribution on the - probability of being allocated. + \item each bidder not only has a utility function that expresses her + utility at the end of the auction, but also maintains a distribution on + the probability of being allocated. \item at each time step, the bidders update their distribution based on what has been observed at the previous step. Hence the bidders' - distribution are a function of the past history up to this point. + distributions are a function of the past history up to this point. \item at each time step, if a bidder is not currently winning, she is - willing to sacrifice some expected utility to increase their + willing to sacrifice some expected utility to increase her probability of being allocated. That is, the agents' are not fully rational with respect to their ``outside-the-auction utility'': while the auction is still running, the utility function that they are @@ -92,4 +92,5 @@ their true utility. \section{Relevant Prior Work} We are planning to consider prior work on first-price auctions where the bidders have multiple rounds of bidding over time, and various mechanisms that can capture this idea. One inspiration comes from the \lq\lq bid-your-utility \rq\rq auction described in the following paper: Hoy, D., Jain, K., \& Wilkens, C. A. (2013, June). A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions. In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce (pp. 583-584). ACM. +We were also planning to get inspiration from the deffered-acceptance mechanism in relation to the ascending-clock auction from the paper P. Duetting, V. Gkatzelis, and T. Roughgarden, The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions. In EC '14. \end{document} -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2