From efae42726c01a2c60a9442b15fab85cca8e0f31a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul <Paul@Pauls-MacBook-Air.local>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2015 13:59:20 -0400
Subject: Tiny change

---
 final/main.tex | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'final/main.tex')

diff --git a/final/main.tex b/final/main.tex
index 4bfff6e..a27f751 100644
--- a/final/main.tex
+++ b/final/main.tex
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ single-item auction (see \citep{hartline}, Chapter 3).
 In particular, if the type of the agent (her value) is drawn from a regular
 distribution, the optimal mechanism which serves the agent with ex-ante
 allocation probability $\hat{x}$ has revenue $\Rev(\hat{x},F)$, given by solving \begin{align*}
-\max_{(x,p)} p(1-F(p)) \\
+\max_{p} p(1-F(p)) \\
 \text{subject to }& 1 - F(p) \leq \hat{x} 
 \end{align*}
 
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