From f7a0f76dee1f03041c5f035d51c24bcb52a0d74b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul <Paul@Pauls-MacBook-Air.local>
Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2015 22:58:36 -0400
Subject: Final updates

---
 final/main.tex | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'final/main.tex')

diff --git a/final/main.tex b/final/main.tex
index 0615c19..1bed3a1 100644
--- a/final/main.tex
+++ b/final/main.tex
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ $(1-\epsilon)\frac{Cm\log m}{m^{3/4}}$. Also note that this mechanism satisfies
 the ex-ante allocation constraints since an item will be sold if and only if it has nonzero
 value, which happens with probability $\frac{1}{m^{3/4}}$.
 
-\paragraph{Computing the Single Item Revenue, $\SRev$} The revenue for each item is the same no matter what the
+\paragraph{Computing the Separate Posted Price Revenue, $\SRev$} The revenue for each item is the same no matter what the
 posted price is and is equal to $\frac{1}{m^{3/4}}$. Hence the overall revenue
 is $\frac{m}{m^{3/4}}$ which is only a $O(\frac{1}{\log m})$ fraction of the revenue of the
 ``good'' mechanism. 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2

