From f7a0f76dee1f03041c5f035d51c24bcb52a0d74b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2015 22:58:36 -0400 Subject: Final updates --- final/main.tex | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'final/main.tex') diff --git a/final/main.tex b/final/main.tex index 0615c19..1bed3a1 100644 --- a/final/main.tex +++ b/final/main.tex @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ $(1-\epsilon)\frac{Cm\log m}{m^{3/4}}$. Also note that this mechanism satisfies the ex-ante allocation constraints since an item will be sold if and only if it has nonzero value, which happens with probability $\frac{1}{m^{3/4}}$. -\paragraph{Computing the Single Item Revenue, $\SRev$} The revenue for each item is the same no matter what the +\paragraph{Computing the Separate Posted Price Revenue, $\SRev$} The revenue for each item is the same no matter what the posted price is and is equal to $\frac{1}{m^{3/4}}$. Hence the overall revenue is $\frac{m}{m^{3/4}}$ which is only a $O(\frac{1}{\log m})$ fraction of the revenue of the ``good'' mechanism. -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2