From b3ec93577ce7835379d31c36f6518848c75c4718 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thibaut Horel <thibaut.horel@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 2 Nov 2014 18:25:59 -0500
Subject: Fix latex error

---
 project/main.tex | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'project/main.tex')

diff --git a/project/main.tex b/project/main.tex
index a0c58a6..c921c1e 100644
--- a/project/main.tex
+++ b/project/main.tex
@@ -90,8 +90,6 @@ behavior of the agents: during the auction they are maximizing a different
 utility function (biased by the probability of winning); this might decrease
 their true utility.
 
-\end{itemize}
-
 \section{Relevant Prior Work} We are planning to consider prior work on first-price auctions where the bidders have multiple rounds of bidding over time, and various mechanisms that can capture this idea. One inspiration comes from the \lq\lq bid-your-utility \rq\rq auction described in the following paper: Hoy, D., Jain, K., \& Wilkens, C. A. (2013, June). A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions. In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce (pp. 583-584). ACM.
 
 \end{document}
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