prob

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/problem.tex b/problem.tex
index b3df3ee..aaca0cc 100644
--- a/problem.tex
+++ b/problem.tex
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ returns a vector of payments $[p_i(c)]_{i\in \mathcal{N}}$.
  \begin{align} p_i(c)\geq c_i\cdot s_i(c).\label{ir}\end{align}
 \item \emph{No Positive Transfers.} Payments are non-negative,\emph{i.e.},
 \begin{align}p_i(c)\geq 0\label{pt}.\end{align} 
-    \item \emph{Truthfulness.} An agent has no incentive to missreport her true cost. Formally, let $c_{-i}$
+    \item \emph{Truthfulness/Incentive Compatibility.} An agent has no incentive to missreport her true cost. Formally, let $c_{-i}$
  be a vector of costs of all agents except $i$. Then, %    $c_{-i}$ being the same). Let $[p_i']_{i\in \mathcal{N}} = p(c_i',
 %    c_{-i})$, then the 
 \begin{align}  p_i(c_i,c_{-i}) - s_i(c_i,c_{-i})\cdot c_i \geq p_i(c_i',c_{-i}) - s(c_i',c_{-i})\cdot c_i\label{truthful}\end{align} for every $i \in \mathcal{N}$ and every two cost vectors $(c_i,c_{-i})$ and $(c_i',c_{-i})$.