diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | problem.tex | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/problem.tex b/problem.tex index b3df3ee..aaca0cc 100644 --- a/problem.tex +++ b/problem.tex @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ returns a vector of payments $[p_i(c)]_{i\in \mathcal{N}}$. \begin{align} p_i(c)\geq c_i\cdot s_i(c).\label{ir}\end{align} \item \emph{No Positive Transfers.} Payments are non-negative,\emph{i.e.}, \begin{align}p_i(c)\geq 0\label{pt}.\end{align} - \item \emph{Truthfulness.} An agent has no incentive to missreport her true cost. Formally, let $c_{-i}$ + \item \emph{Truthfulness/Incentive Compatibility.} An agent has no incentive to missreport her true cost. Formally, let $c_{-i}$ be a vector of costs of all agents except $i$. Then, % $c_{-i}$ being the same). Let $[p_i']_{i\in \mathcal{N}} = p(c_i', % c_{-i})$, then the \begin{align} p_i(c_i,c_{-i}) - s_i(c_i,c_{-i})\cdot c_i \geq p_i(c_i',c_{-i}) - s(c_i',c_{-i})\cdot c_i\label{truthful}\end{align} for every $i \in \mathcal{N}$ and every two cost vectors $(c_i,c_{-i})$ and $(c_i',c_{-i})$. |