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diff --git a/counterexample.tex b/counterexample.tex
index 896d672..6e21de5 100644
--- a/counterexample.tex
+++ b/counterexample.tex
@@ -59,4 +59,4 @@ Hence, the greedy solution will be $\{x_3, x_4\}$ with value:
As a consequence the mechanism will allocate to user $1$ in this case. By
reducing her cost, user 3, who was previously allocated, is now rejected by the
mechanism. This contradicts the monotonicity of the allocation rule, hence its
-truthfulness by Myerson's theorem \cite{myerson}.
+truthfulness by Myerson's theorem \cite{myerson}, which states that a single parameter auction is truthful if and only if the allocation function is monotone and agents are paid theshold payments.