From c7ca7fb461ec2044f8aefcedfcd903d8b5945fc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thibaut Horel <thibaut.horel@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2013 18:28:41 -0400
Subject: Last fixes

---
 appendix.tex | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'appendix.tex')

diff --git a/appendix.tex b/appendix.tex
index 1a5bcc5..6926e00 100755
--- a/appendix.tex
+++ b/appendix.tex
@@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ Placing the expression of $C$ in \eqref{eq:bound1} and \eqref{eq:bound2}
 gives the approximation ratio in \eqref{approxbound}, and concludes the proof
 of Theorem~\ref{thm:main}.\hspace*{\stretch{1}}\qed
 
-Finally, we prove the lower bound stated in Theorem~\ref{thm:main}
+Finally, we prove the lower bound stated in Theorem~\ref{thm:main}.
 Suppose, for contradiction, that such a mechanism exists. From Myerson's Theorem \cite{myerson}, a single parameter auction is truthful if and only if the allocation function is monotone and agents are paid theshold payments. Consider two
 experiments with dimension $d=2$, such that $x_1 = e_1=[1 ,0]$, $x_2=e_2=[0,1]$
 and $c_1=c_2=B/2+\epsilon$. Then, one of the two experiments, say, $x_1$, must
-- 
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