From 56ef116dcbe0d4b81f7b5bc2d38d9d51add2c62a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stratis Ioannidis Date: Sun, 7 Jul 2013 19:01:14 -0700 Subject: monotone --- counterexample.tex | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'counterexample.tex') diff --git a/counterexample.tex b/counterexample.tex index 896d672..6e21de5 100644 --- a/counterexample.tex +++ b/counterexample.tex @@ -59,4 +59,4 @@ Hence, the greedy solution will be $\{x_3, x_4\}$ with value: As a consequence the mechanism will allocate to user $1$ in this case. By reducing her cost, user 3, who was previously allocated, is now rejected by the mechanism. This contradicts the monotonicity of the allocation rule, hence its -truthfulness by Myerson's theorem \cite{myerson}. +truthfulness by Myerson's theorem \cite{myerson}, which states that a single parameter auction is truthful if and only if the allocation function is monotone and agents are paid theshold payments. -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2