From 56ef116dcbe0d4b81f7b5bc2d38d9d51add2c62a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stratis Ioannidis <stratis@stratis-Latitude-E6320.(none)>
Date: Sun, 7 Jul 2013 19:01:14 -0700
Subject: monotone

---
 counterexample.tex | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'counterexample.tex')

diff --git a/counterexample.tex b/counterexample.tex
index 896d672..6e21de5 100644
--- a/counterexample.tex
+++ b/counterexample.tex
@@ -59,4 +59,4 @@ Hence, the greedy solution will be $\{x_3, x_4\}$ with value:
 As a consequence the mechanism will allocate to user $1$ in this case. By
 reducing her cost, user 3, who was previously allocated, is now rejected by the
 mechanism. This contradicts the monotonicity of the allocation rule, hence its
-truthfulness by Myerson's theorem \cite{myerson}.
+truthfulness by Myerson's theorem \cite{myerson}, which states that a single parameter auction is truthful if and only if the allocation function is monotone and agents are paid theshold payments.
-- 
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