From 656e4a1283a4e926d8b5d84eb8b702e4c7a48656 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stratis Ioannidis <stratis@Stratiss-MacBook-Air.local>
Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2013 22:23:35 +0200
Subject: stintrorelated

---
 intro.tex | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'intro.tex')

diff --git a/intro.tex b/intro.tex
index 166f07e..da38f8f 100755
--- a/intro.tex
+++ b/intro.tex
@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@ However, we are not aware of a principled study of this setting from a strategic
 
 % When subjects are strategic, they may have an incentive to misreport their cost, leading to the need for a sophisticated choice of experiments and payments. Arguably, user incentiviation is of particular pertinence due to the extent of statistical analysis over user data on the Internet. %, which has led to the rise of several different research efforts in studying data markets \cite{...}.
 
-Our contributions are as follows. \emph{(1)} We initiate the study of experimental design in the presence of a budget and strategic subjects. 
+Our contributions are as follows. \emph{First}, we initiate the study of experimental design in the presence of a budget and strategic subjects. 
 %formulate the problem of experimental design subject to a given budget, in the presence of strategic agents who may lie about their costs. %In particular, we focus on linear regression. This is naturally viewed  as a budget feasible mechanism design problem, in which the objective function %is sophisticated and 
 %is  related to the covariance of the $x_i$'s.
  In particular, we formulate the  {\em  Experimental Design Problem} (\SEDP) as
  follows: the experimenter \E\ wishes to find a set $S$ of subjects to maximize 
-\begin{align}V(S) = \log\det\Big(I_d+\sum_{i\in S}x_i\T{x_i}\Big) \label{obj}\end{align}
+\begin{align}V(S) = \log\det\Big(I_d+\textstyle\sum_{i\in S}x_i\T{x_i}\Big) \label{obj}\end{align}
 subject to a budget constraint $\sum_{i\in S}c_i\leq B$, where $B$ is \E's budget. When subjects are strategic, the above problem can be naturally approached  as a \emph{budget feasible mechanism design} problem, as introduced by \citeN{singer-mechanisms}.
 %, and other {\em strategic constraints} we don't list here.  
-The objective function, which is the key, is formally obtained by optimizing  the information gain in  $\beta$ when the latter is learned  through ridge regression, and is related to  the so-called $D$-optimality criterion~\cite{pukelsheim2006optimal,atkinson2007optimum}. \emph{(2)} We present a polynomial time mechanism scheme for \SEDP{} that is approximately truthful and yields a constant factor ($\approx 12.98$) approximation to the optimal value of \eqref{obj}. %In particular, for any small $\delta>0$ and $\varepsilon>0$, we can construct a $(12.98\,,\varepsilon)$-approximate mechanism that is $\delta$-truthful and runs in polynomial time in both $n$ and  $\log\log\frac{B}{\epsilon\delta}$. 
+The objective function, which is the key, is formally obtained by optimizing  the information gain in  $\beta$ when the latter is learned  through ridge regression, and is related to  the so-called $D$-optimality criterion~\cite{pukelsheim2006optimal,atkinson2007optimum}. \emph{Second}, we present a polynomial time mechanism scheme for \SEDP{} that is approximately truthful and yields a constant factor ($\approx 12.98$) approximation to the optimal value of \eqref{obj}. %In particular, for any small $\delta>0$ and $\varepsilon>0$, we can construct a $(12.98\,,\varepsilon)$-approximate mechanism that is $\delta$-truthful and runs in polynomial time in both $n$ and  $\log\log\frac{B}{\epsilon\delta}$. 
 In contrast to this, we show that no truthful, budget-feasible mechanisms are possible for \SEDP{}  within a factor 2 approximation. 
 
 We note that the objective \eqref{obj} is submodular. Using this fact, applying previous results on budget feasible mechanism design under general submodular objectives~\cite{singer-mechanisms,chen} would yield either a deterministic, truthful, constant-approximation mechanism that requires exponential time,  or a non-determi\-nis\-tic, (universally) truthful, poly-time mechanism that yields a constant approximation ratio only \emph{in expectation} (\emph{i.e.}, its approximation guarantee for a given instance may in fact be unbounded).
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