From 6fbec767041e452c046b9a56251897a87b3e9135 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thibaut Horel <thibaut.horel@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2013 20:03:32 -0800
Subject: Typos

---
 intro.tex | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'intro.tex')

diff --git a/intro.tex b/intro.tex
index 7b3114f..7dcc39c 100644
--- a/intro.tex
+++ b/intro.tex
@@ -29,10 +29,11 @@ However, we are not aware of a principled study of this setting from a strategic
 Our contributions are as follows.
 \begin{itemize}
 \item
-We initiate the study of experimental design problem in presence of budgets and strategic subjects. 
+We initiate the study of experimental design problem in presence of a budget and strategic subjects. 
 %formulate the problem of experimental design subject to a given budget, in the presence of strategic agents who may lie about their costs. %In particular, we focus on linear regression. This is naturally viewed  as a budget feasible mechanism design problem, in which the objective function %is sophisticated and 
 %is  related to the covariance of the $x_i$'s.
- In particular, we formulate the  {\em  Experimental Design Problem} (\SEDP) as follows: the experimenter \E\ wishes to find set $S$ of subjects to maximize 
+ In particular, we formulate the  {\em  Experimental Design Problem} (\SEDP) as
+ follows: the experimenter \E\ wishes to find a set $S$ of subjects to maximize 
 \begin{align}V(S) = \log\det\Big(I_d+\sum_{i\in S}x_i\T{x_i}\Big) \label{obj}\end{align}
 subject to a budget constraint $\sum_{i\in S}c_i\leq B$, where $B$ is \E's budget. When subjects are strategic, the above problem can be naturally approached  as a \emph{budget feasible mechanism design} problem, as introduced by \citeN{singer-mechanisms}.
 %, and other {\em strategic constraints} we don't list here.
-- 
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