From 1aec92a787374451c7757be86bd27ee4ac064c41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thibaut Horel <thibaut.horel@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 17:01:27 +0100
Subject: Some typos

---
 main.tex | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'main.tex')

diff --git a/main.tex b/main.tex
index 53de028..cfb7799 100644
--- a/main.tex
+++ b/main.tex
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ One possible interpretation of \eqref{modified} is that, prior to the auction, t
 
 \subsection{Truthful, Constant Approximation Mechanism}
 
-
 In this section we present a mechanism for \EDP. Previous works on maximizing
 submodular functions \cite{nemhauser, sviridenko-submodular} and designing
 auction mechanisms for submodular utility functions \cite{singer-mechanisms,
@@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ OPT(V,\mathcal{N},B) \leq \frac{e}{e-1}\big( 3 V(S_G) + 2 V(i^*)\big)
 \end{lemma}
 
 Hence, taking the maximum between the greedy set and the point of maximum value
-has an approximation ratio of $\frac{5e}{e-1}$. However, Singer
+yields an approximation ratio of $\frac{5e}{e-1}$. However, Singer
 \cite{singer-influence} notes that this approach breaks incentive compatibility
 and therefore cannot be directly applied to the strategic case.
 
-- 
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