From fca9d9fca8141e104b792ce0b27346d83af71b82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stratis Ioannidis <stratis@stratis-Latitude-E6320.(none)>
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2013 19:29:32 -0800
Subject: small changes

---
 main.tex | 4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'main.tex')

diff --git a/main.tex b/main.tex
index fa8558e..469995d 100644
--- a/main.tex
+++ b/main.tex
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ the following algorithm:
 \textbf{if}\; V(\{i^*\}) \geq V(S_G)\; \textbf{return}\; \{i^*\}
 \;\textbf{else return}\; S_G
 \end{equation}
-has an approximation ratio of $\frac{5e}{e-1}$ \cite{chen}.
+has a constant approximation ratio \cite{singer-mechanisms}.
 
 \subsection{Submodular Maximization in the Strategic Case}
 
@@ -146,8 +146,6 @@ We can now state our main result:
 \end{theorem}
 The value of the constant $C$ is given by \eqref{eq:constant} in
 Section~\ref{sec:proofofmainthm}.
-
-\fussy
 In addition, we prove the following simple lower bound.
 \begin{theorem}\label{thm:lowerbound}
 There is no $2$-approximate, truthful, budget feasible, individually rational mechanism for EDP. 
-- 
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