From b6aa0b124de02bda659db226ef66f1886f98252e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stratis Ioannidis <stratis@stratis-Latitude-E6320.(none)>
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 23:42:57 -0700
Subject: stratis comments

---
 problem.tex | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'problem.tex')

diff --git a/problem.tex b/problem.tex
index 468ab01..03ce49b 100644
--- a/problem.tex
+++ b/problem.tex
@@ -47,9 +47,9 @@ incentivize her participation in the study.
 
 A mechanism $\mathcal{M} = (f,p)$ comprises (a) an \emph{allocation function}
 $f:\reals_+^n \to 2^\mathcal{N}$ and (b) a \emph{payment function}
-$p:\reals_+^n\to \reals_+^n$. The allocation function determines, given the
-vector or costs $[c_i]_{i\in\mathcal{N}}$, the set
-$S\subseteq \mathcal{N}$ of experiments to be conducted. The payment function
+$p:\reals_+^n\to \reals_+^n$. Given the
+vector or costs $[c_i]_{i\in\mathcal{N}}$, the allocation function determines the set
+$S\subseteq \mathcal{N}$ of experiments to be conducted, while the payment function
 returns a vector of payments $[p_i]_{i\in \mathcal{N}}$. As in
 \cite{singer-mechanisms, chen}, we study mechanisms that are normalized
 ($i\notin S$ implies $p_i=0$), individually rational ($p_i\geq c_i$) and have
@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ $\inf\{c_i: i\in f(c_i, c_{-i})\}$.
 \end{itemize}
 \end{theorem}
 
+\stratis{Explain why this is important and what it implies about the things we need to prove. Also, don't overuse bullets.}
+
 \begin{comment}
 \subsection{Experimental Design}
 
-- 
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