From 0d429224b86ee6b4002e53214c4d2c9222ecbe27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stratis Ioannidis <stratis@stratis-Latitude-E6320.(none)>
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 09:57:24 -0800
Subject: intro main

---
 problem.tex | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'problem.tex')

diff --git a/problem.tex b/problem.tex
index 363731a..e3ee84b 100644
--- a/problem.tex
+++ b/problem.tex
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ A mechanism is truthful iff  every $i \in \mathcal{N}$ and every two cost vector
         OPT(V,\mathcal{N}, B) \leq \alpha V(S).
     \end{displaymath}
     The approximation ratio captures the \emph{price of truthfulness}, \emph{i.e.},  the relative value loss incurred by adding the truthfulness constraint. % to the value function maximization.
-    \item \emph{Computationally efficient.} The allocation and payment function
+    \item \emph{Computational efficiency.} The allocation and payment function
     should be computable in polynomial time in the number of
     agents $n$. %\thibaut{Should we say something about the black-box model for $V$?  Needed to say something in general, but not in our case where the value function can be computed in polynomial time}.
 \end{itemize}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2

