From 9c7c18014f41ad1cd52404b69109d83dd6f6acc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thibaut Horel <thibaut.horel@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2013 23:17:51 -0500
Subject: Fix a compilation error

---
 related.tex | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'related.tex')

diff --git a/related.tex b/related.tex
index a78693b..274f4fa 100755
--- a/related.tex
+++ b/related.tex
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Posted price, rather than direct revelation mechanisms, are also studied in \cit
 \noindent\emph{Monotone Approximations in Combinatorial Auctions.}
 Relaxations of combinatorial problems are prevalent
 in \emph{combinatorial auctions}, 
-in which an auctioneer aims at maximizing the social welfare..e.}. As noted by \citeN{archer-approximate},
+in which an auctioneer aims at maximizing the social welfare. As noted by \citeN{archer-approximate},
 approximations to this maximization must preserve incentive compatibility. Most approximation
 algorithms do not preserve this property, hence specific relaxations, and corresponding roundings to an integral solution, must be
 constructed \cite{archer-approximate,lavi-truthful,dughmi-truthful,briest-approximation}. Because of the specificity of our relaxation, and because we seek a determinist mechanism and $\delta$-truthfulness, not truthfulness-in-expectation, none of the techniques present in these works apply to our setting.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2

