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+\documentclass[12pt]{article}
+\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
+\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
+\usepackage[hmargin=1.2in, vmargin=1.2in]{geometry}
+
+\title{Review of \emph{Complexity Theory, Game Theory and Economics} (Tim
+Roughgarden)}
+\author{Thibaut Horel}
+
+\begin{document}
+
+\vspace{-5em}
+
+\maketitle
+
+
+\section*{General impression} Very nice selection of topics, striking
+a nice balance between covering classical results and recent papers. The level
+of exposition feels right for a general theory audience.
+
+\section*{Solar lecture 1}
+
+\begin{itemize}
+
+	\item Section 1.2.3: I suggest also introducing the concept of \emph{pure
+		strategy} when defining a \emph{mixed strategy} below the payoff
+		matrix. Once this term is defined, I think it should be used instead of
+		\emph{deterministic strategy} in later sections (or even lectures?)
+
+\item Proof of Theorem 1.1: I would add variables $v, x$ below the $\max$ in
+	the first equation to make it clear what the maximization is over.
+		Similarly, add $w, y$ below the $\min$ in the second equation.
+
+\item Section 1.2.6: check oppositional/cooperative. Furthermore, I think the
+	content of this section should be moved to the beginning of Section 1.4 to
+		motivate the transition to bimatrix games. At the moment, it feels that
+		it is breaking the flow.
+
+\item Section 1.2.7: add quote by Jain.
+
+\item Section 1.3.1: the first paragraph is slightly confusing, because it is
+	said that players only know their own payoffs (and not those of the other
+		player) but the focus of Section 1.3 at this point seems to be zero-sum
+		games. I would clarify that the notion of uncoupled dynamics as it is
+		defined here is for arbitrary bimatrix games.
+
+\item Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2: the two framed boxes are slightly ill-defined
+	for $t=1$ since there is no history then. I would maybe make $t=1$ an
+		explicit ``initialization'' step and then say ``At time step $t\geq
+		2$''.
+
+\item Example 1.7: maybe add that $\eta=+\infty$ corresponds to fictitious play
+	\emph{with uniformly random tie-breaking}.
+
+\item Example 1.7: in the framed box, behavior at $t=1$ is ill-defined,
+	initialize with uniformly random strategy?
+
+\item Theorem 1.8: say in the theorem statement that this is for a choice of
+	$\eta_t = \Theta(\sqrt{t})$.
+
+\item Theorem 1.8: I am curious about the implication of this theorem for the
+	computation of a Nash equilibrium: how does it compare to generic solvers
+		for linear programs (e.g. the ellipsoid method)?
+
+\item Theorem 1.10: say that $n=|\Lambda|$.
+
+\item Section 1.3.7: the first sentence is unnecessary, the proof seems
+	complete to me.
+
+\item Example 1.13: Is this the ``battle of the sexes'' game?
+
+\end{itemize}
+
+\paragraph{Typos.} \begin{itemize}
+	\item footnote 4 p. 8: welfare $\rightarrow$ warfare
+	\item definition 1.2: right-hind $\rightarrow$ right-hand
+	\item first paragraph of 1.3.1: a la $\rightarrow$ à la
+\end{itemize}
+
+\section*{Solar lecture 2}
+
+\paragraph{Typos.} \begin{itemize}
+\end{itemize}
+
+\end{document}