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| author | Paul <Paul@Pauls-MacBook-Air.local> | 2015-08-30 22:58:36 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul <Paul@Pauls-MacBook-Air.local> | 2015-08-30 22:58:36 -0400 |
| commit | f7a0f76dee1f03041c5f035d51c24bcb52a0d74b (patch) | |
| tree | e441223ff6aa5a905843286c4c9af163c5a3e9b7 /final | |
| parent | 3819249285f410871226ec18f87bed3b1810c018 (diff) | |
| download | econ2099-f7a0f76dee1f03041c5f035d51c24bcb52a0d74b.tar.gz | |
Diffstat (limited to 'final')
| -rw-r--r-- | final/main.tex | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/final/main.tex b/final/main.tex index 0615c19..1bed3a1 100644 --- a/final/main.tex +++ b/final/main.tex @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ $(1-\epsilon)\frac{Cm\log m}{m^{3/4}}$. Also note that this mechanism satisfies the ex-ante allocation constraints since an item will be sold if and only if it has nonzero value, which happens with probability $\frac{1}{m^{3/4}}$. -\paragraph{Computing the Single Item Revenue, $\SRev$} The revenue for each item is the same no matter what the +\paragraph{Computing the Separate Posted Price Revenue, $\SRev$} The revenue for each item is the same no matter what the posted price is and is equal to $\frac{1}{m^{3/4}}$. Hence the overall revenue is $\frac{m}{m^{3/4}}$ which is only a $O(\frac{1}{\log m})$ fraction of the revenue of the ``good'' mechanism. |