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authorPaul <Paul@Pauls-MacBook-Air.local>2014-12-11 17:27:32 -0500
committerPaul <Paul@Pauls-MacBook-Air.local>2014-12-11 17:27:32 -0500
commit83343e9e31971a58b100c68522c47d1ab3830530 (patch)
tree7fe7fc9d45cf50691bcbc62a1147e07038b61d90 /project2/main.tex
parent2144ef3d2276d669775230c05cbea47fb6a14e15 (diff)
downloadecon2099-83343e9e31971a58b100c68522c47d1ab3830530.tar.gz
More stuff for this version, just to have it
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1 files changed, 4 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/project2/main.tex b/project2/main.tex
index 8497ff6..f83f79b 100644
--- a/project2/main.tex
+++ b/project2/main.tex
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
We are interested in a multi-item auction for agents with submodular
preferences.
-If we denote by $m$ the number of items, we look at a specific case where the
+If we denote by $m$ the number of items, we look at a specific case where the
type $t$ of an agent is a vector $t=(t_1,\ldots,t_m)$ drawn from a distribution
$F$ over $\mathbb{R}_+^m$ and for an allocation $x$ and price
$p$, the utility of the agent is:
@@ -59,9 +59,10 @@ $g(0) = 0$.
\section{Related Work}
-\cite{babaioff}
-\cite{yao}
+In \cite{babaioff}, the authors describe a setting with a monopolist seller, offering $n$ heterogeneous goods, and a single buyer.
\cite{hart}
+\cite{hartline}
+\cite{yao}
\bibliographystyle{abbrv}
\bibliography{main}