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| author | Thibaut Horel <thibaut.horel@gmail.com> | 2014-12-11 10:44:11 -0500 |
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| committer | Thibaut Horel <thibaut.horel@gmail.com> | 2014-12-11 10:44:11 -0500 |
| commit | e1f020a9cc90449f403bc25cf2b28488dedd3621 (patch) | |
| tree | af829a71f1b38722fa18d5b0a827acc1580a539c /project2 | |
| parent | d1926d2b60d7ee81f30a01a032458d1d6f239b1a (diff) | |
| download | econ2099-e1f020a9cc90449f403bc25cf2b28488dedd3621.tar.gz | |
Problem statement
Diffstat (limited to 'project2')
| -rw-r--r-- | project2/main.tex | 18 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/project2/main.tex b/project2/main.tex index e2f93c2..8497ff6 100644 --- a/project2/main.tex +++ b/project2/main.tex @@ -41,6 +41,24 @@ \maketitle +\section{Problem} + +We are interested in a multi-item auction for agents with submodular +preferences. + +If we denote by $m$ the number of items, we look at a specific case where the +type $t$ of an agent is a vector $t=(t_1,\ldots,t_m)$ drawn from a distribution +$F$ over $\mathbb{R}_+^m$ and for an allocation $x$ and price +$p$, the utility of the agent is: +\begin{displaymath} + u(t, x, p) = \sum_{S\subseteq 2^m} x(S)g\left(1+\sum_{j\in S} t_j\right)-p +\end{displaymath} +where $g$ is a concave function from $\mathbb{R}_+$ to $\mathbb{R}_+$ with +$g(0) = 0$. + + +\section{Related Work} + \cite{babaioff} \cite{yao} \cite{hart} |
