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| -rw-r--r-- | final/main.tex | 2 |
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diff --git a/final/main.tex b/final/main.tex index 4bfff6e..a27f751 100644 --- a/final/main.tex +++ b/final/main.tex @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ single-item auction (see \citep{hartline}, Chapter 3). In particular, if the type of the agent (her value) is drawn from a regular distribution, the optimal mechanism which serves the agent with ex-ante allocation probability $\hat{x}$ has revenue $\Rev(\hat{x},F)$, given by solving \begin{align*} -\max_{(x,p)} p(1-F(p)) \\ +\max_{p} p(1-F(p)) \\ \text{subject to }& 1 - F(p) \leq \hat{x} \end{align*} |