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@article{babaioff,
author = {Moshe Babaioff and
Nicole Immorlica and
Brendan Lucier and
S. Matthew Weinberg},
title = {A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer},
journal = {FOCS},
year = {2014}
}
@article{yao,
author = {Andrew Chi{-}Chih Yao},
title = {An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications},
journal = {CoRR},
volume = {abs/1406.3278},
year = {2014}
}
@inproceedings{hart,
author = {Sergiu Hart and
Noam Nisan},
title = {The menu-size complexity of auctions},
booktitle = {{ACM} Conference on Electronic Commerce, {EC} '13, Philadelphia, PA,
USA, June 16-20, 2013},
pages = {565--566},
year = {2013}
}
@book{hartline,
author = {Jason D. Hartline},
title = {Mechanism Design and Approximation},
year = {2014},
publisher={Available at http://jasonhartline.com/MDnA/}
}
@article{hartlinebayes,
author = {Jason D. Hartline},
title = {Bayesian Mechanism Design},
journal = {Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science},
volume = {8},
number = {3},
pages = {143--263},
year = {2013},
}
@article{armstrong,
title={Price discrimination by a many-product firm},
author={Armstrong, Mark},
journal={The Review of Economic Studies},
volume={66},
number={1},
pages={151--168},
year={1999},
publisher={Oxford University Press}
}
@inproceedings{alaei,
title={Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers},
author={Alaei, S},
booktitle={Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on},
pages={512--521},
year={2011},
organization={IEEE}
}
@inproceedings{hart-nisan,
author = {Sergiu Hart and
Noam Nisan},
title = {Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items},
booktitle = {{ACM} Conference on Electronic Commerce, {EC} '12, Valencia, Spain,
June 4-8, 2012},
pages = {656},
year = {2012}
}
@inproceedings{alaeietal,
author = {Saeed Alaei and
Hu Fu and
Nima Haghpanah and
Jason D. Hartline},
title = {The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions},
booktitle = {54th Annual {IEEE} Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, {FOCS}
2013, 26-29 October, 2013, Berkeley, CA, {USA}},
pages = {628--637},
year = {2013},
}
@article{liyao,
author = {Xinye Li and Andrew Chi{-}Chih Yao},
title = {On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items},
journal = {Proccedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
volume = {110},
number = {28},
pages = {11232--11237},
year = {2013},
}
@article{rubinstein,
author = {Aviad Rubinstein and
S. Matthew Weinberg},
title = {Simple Mechanisms for a Combinatorial Buyer and Applications to Revenue
Monotonicity},
journal = {CoRR},
volume = {abs/1501.07637},
year = {2015}
}
@article{rubinstein2,
author = {Aviad Rubinstein},
title = {On the Computational Complexity of Optimal Simple Mechanisms},
journal = {Preprint},
year = {2015}
}
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