muthu fix edits

2 files changed, 0 insertions, 15 deletions

diff --git a/intro.tex b/intro.tex
index c5d7a9f..2e5c8af 100644
--- a/intro.tex
+++ b/intro.tex
@@ -24,13 +24,7 @@ Our contributions are as follows.
 We formulate the problem of experimental design subject to a given budget, in presence of strategic agents who specify their costs. In particular, we focus on linear regression. This is naturally viewed  as a budget feasible mechanism design problem. The objective function is sophisticated and is  related to the covariance of the $x_i$'s. In particular we formulate the  {\em Experimental Design Problem} (\EDP) as follows: the experimenter \E\ wishes to find set $S$ of subjects to maximize 
 \begin{align}V(S) = \log\det(I_d+\sum_{i\in S}x_i\T{x_i}) \label{obj}\end{align}
 with a  budget constraint $\sum_{i\in S}c_i\leq B$, where $B$ is \E's budget. %, and other {\em strategic constraints} we don't list here.
-<<<<<<< HEAD
 The objective function, which is the key,  is obtained by optimizing  the information gain in  $\beta$ when it is learned  through linear regression methods, and is the so-called $D$-objective criterion in the literature. 
- 
-=======
- The objective function, which is the key, is motivated from the so-called $D$-optimality criterion; in particular, it captures the reduction in the entropy of $\beta$ when the latter is learned  through linear regression methods.
-
->>>>>>> c29302b25adf190f98019eb8ce5f79b10b66d54d
 \item
 The above objective is submodular. 
 There are several recent results in budget feasible 
diff --git a/problem.tex b/problem.tex
index a0a4419..8b1cb2b 100644
--- a/problem.tex
+++ b/problem.tex
@@ -108,19 +108,10 @@ c_{-i})$ implies $i\in f(c_i', c_{-i})$, and (b)
 %\end{enumerate}
 \end{lemma}
 \fussy
-<<<<<<< HEAD
 Myerson's Theorem
 % is particularly useful when designing a budget feasible truthful mechanism, as it 
 allows us to focus on designing a monotone allocation function. Then, the
 mechanism will be truthful as long as we give each agent her threshold payment---the caveat being that the latter need to sum to a value below $B$.
-=======
-Myerson's Theorem is particularly useful when designing a budget feasible truthful
-mechanism. One can focus on designing a monotone allocation function, and the
-resulting mechanism will be truthful as long as each agent is given her
-threshold payment---the caveat being that the latter need to sum to a value
-below $B$.
->>>>>>> c29302b25adf190f98019eb8ce5f79b10b66d54d
-
 \subsection{Budget Feasible Experimental Design}
 
 We approach the problem of optimal experimental design from the