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| author | Stratis Ioannidis <stratis@stratis-Latitude-E6320.(none)> | 2013-07-07 19:01:14 -0700 |
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| committer | Stratis Ioannidis <stratis@stratis-Latitude-E6320.(none)> | 2013-07-07 19:01:14 -0700 |
| commit | 56ef116dcbe0d4b81f7b5bc2d38d9d51add2c62a (patch) | |
| tree | 800567724595ce6f09321db7c4ff500cf35dddf5 /counterexample.tex | |
| parent | da4fe3de47f808d2aa77895880b5866f56cc066d (diff) | |
| download | recommendation-56ef116dcbe0d4b81f7b5bc2d38d9d51add2c62a.tar.gz | |
monotone
Diffstat (limited to 'counterexample.tex')
| -rw-r--r-- | counterexample.tex | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/counterexample.tex b/counterexample.tex index 896d672..6e21de5 100644 --- a/counterexample.tex +++ b/counterexample.tex @@ -59,4 +59,4 @@ Hence, the greedy solution will be $\{x_3, x_4\}$ with value: As a consequence the mechanism will allocate to user $1$ in this case. By reducing her cost, user 3, who was previously allocated, is now rejected by the mechanism. This contradicts the monotonicity of the allocation rule, hence its -truthfulness by Myerson's theorem \cite{myerson}. +truthfulness by Myerson's theorem \cite{myerson}, which states that a single parameter auction is truthful if and only if the allocation function is monotone and agents are paid theshold payments. |