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| author | Stratis Ioannidis <stratis@stratis-Latitude-E6320.(none)> | 2012-11-05 13:13:54 -0800 |
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| committer | Stratis Ioannidis <stratis@stratis-Latitude-E6320.(none)> | 2012-11-05 13:13:54 -0800 |
| commit | b0d1e82017eb270398a5747ff2b46969e720b52a (patch) | |
| tree | 591931ebc545f78cebf2129e9466b60e06c87253 /intro.tex | |
| parent | c5438848e77fca83bdf022efe002204a8273a2bb (diff) | |
| download | recommendation-b0d1e82017eb270398a5747ff2b46969e720b52a.tar.gz | |
intro abstract muthu
Diffstat (limited to 'intro.tex')
| -rw-r--r-- | intro.tex | 2 |
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ However, there is a cost $c_i$ associated with experimenting on subject $i$ which varies from subject to subject. This may be viewed as the cost subject $i$ incurs when tested and for which she needs to be reimbursed; or, it might be viewed as the incentive for $i$ -to participate in the experiment; or, it might be the inherent value of the data. When subjects are strategic, they may have an incentive to misreport their cost. This economic aspect has always been inherent in experimental design: experimenters often work within strict budgets and design creative incentives. However, we are not aware of principled study of this setting from a strategic point of view. +to participate in the experiment; or, it might be the inherent value of the data. This economic aspect has always been inherent in experimental design: experimenters often work within strict budgets and design creative incentives. However, we are not aware of principled study of this setting from a strategic point of view. When subjects are strategic, they may have an incentive to misreport their cost and the choice of experiments and payments need to be more sophisticated. Our contributions are as follows. |