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authorThibaut Horel <thibaut.horel@gmail.com>2012-11-05 17:53:19 +0100
committerThibaut Horel <thibaut.horel@gmail.com>2012-11-05 17:53:19 +0100
commitb3c19ae2cbbdeec29f1c383b319119b0672e14f8 (patch)
tree73ea60da9d3d8d154cb2356625e5bcdaf83454c9 /main.tex
parent431085fd4bb4902922e1a4539e4ba4386537522f (diff)
downloadrecommendation-b3c19ae2cbbdeec29f1c383b319119b0672e14f8.tar.gz
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@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ problems, Chen et al.~\cite{chen} %for \textsc{Knapsack} and Singer
propose comparing
$V(i^*)$ to %$OPT(R_{\mathcal{N}\setminus\{i\}}, B)$, where $R$ denotes
the optimal value of a \emph{fractional relaxation} of the function $V$ over the set
-$\mathcal{N}$. A fuction $R:[0, 1]^{n}\to\reals_+$ defined on the hypercube $[0, 1]^{n}$ is a fractional relaxation of $V$
+$\mathcal{N}$. A function $R:[0, 1]^{n}\to\reals_+$ defined on the hypercube $[0, 1]^{n}$ is a fractional relaxation of $V$
over the set $\mathcal{N}$ if %(a) $R$ is a function defined on the hypercube $[0, 1]^{n}$ and (b)
$R(\id_S) = V(S)$ for all $S\subseteq\mathcal{N}$, where
$\id_S$ denotes the indicator vector of $S$. The optimization program
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ characterization from Singer \cite{singer-mechanisms} gives a formula to
We can now state our main result:
\begin{theorem}\label{thm:main}
- The allocation described in Algorithm~\ref{mechanism}, along with threshold payments, is truthful, individiually rational
+ The allocation described in Algorithm~\ref{mechanism}, along with threshold payments, is truthful, individually rational
and budget feasible. Furthermore, for any $\varepsilon>0$, the mechanism
has complexity $O\left(\text{poly}(n, d,
\log\log \varepsilon^{-1})\right)$ and returns a set $S^*$ such that:
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ We can now state our main result:
Note that this implies we construct a poly-time mechanism with accuracy arbitrarily close to 19.68, by taking $\varepsilon = \ldots$\stratis{fix me}.
In addition, we prove the following lower bound.
\begin{theorem}\label{thm:lowerbound}
-There is no $2$-approximate, truthful, budget feasible, individionally rational mechanism for EDP.
+There is no $2$-approximate, truthful, budget feasible, individually rational mechanism for EDP.
\end{theorem}
%\stratis{move the proof as appropriate}
\begin{proof}