approx

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/problem.tex b/problem.tex
index 4e31ac1..bb69120 100644
--- a/problem.tex
+++ b/problem.tex
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ returns a vector of payments $[p_i(c)]_{i\in \mathcal{N}}$.
 costs: $p_i(c)\geq c_i\cdot s_i(c).\label{ir}$
 \item \emph{No Positive Transfers.} Payments are non-negative: $p_i(c)\geq 0\label{pt}$.
 \item \emph{$\delta$-Truthfulness.} Reporting one's true cost is
-a $\delta$-dominant strategy. Formally, let $c_{-i}$
+an \emph{almost-dominant} \cite{schummer2004almost} strategy. Formally, let $c_{-i}$
  be a vector of costs of all agents except $i$. Then, $p_i(c_i,c_{-i})
  - s_i(c_i,c_{-i})\cdot c_i \geq p_i(c_i',c_{-i}) - s_i(c_i',c_{-i})\cdot c_i,
  \label{truthful}$ for every $i \in \mathcal{N}$ and every two cost vectors $(c_i,c_{-i})$ and $(c_i',c_{-i})$ such that $|c_i-c_i'|>\delta.$ The mechanism is \emph{truthful} if $\delta=0$.