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| author | Stratis Ioannidis <stratis@stratis-Latitude-E6320.(none)> | 2012-11-05 07:12:01 -0800 |
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| committer | Stratis Ioannidis <stratis@stratis-Latitude-E6320.(none)> | 2012-11-05 07:12:01 -0800 |
| commit | 20b0b3120e47d8afa3382fcaa643fd13560525fa (patch) | |
| tree | 8264e12ebab59ff0a21ff0affc28b59db09c29e7 /related.tex | |
| parent | e35250d619d2fd4f59c26cce7a6cffef213d3058 (diff) | |
| download | recommendation-20b0b3120e47d8afa3382fcaa643fd13560525fa.tar.gz | |
muthu
Diffstat (limited to 'related.tex')
| -rw-r--r-- | related.tex | 2 |
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diff --git a/related.tex b/related.tex index f61abc4..ec22041 100644 --- a/related.tex +++ b/related.tex @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ \section{Related work} - +\label{sec:related} Budget feasible mechanism design was originally proposed by Singer \cite{singer-mechanisms}. Singer considers the problem of maximizing an arbitrary submodular function subject to a budget constraint in the \emph{value query} model, \emph{i.e.} assuming an oracle providing the value of the submodular objective on any given set. Singer shows that there exists a randomized, 112-approximation mechanism for submodular maximization that is \emph{universally truthful} (\emph{i.e.}, it is a randomized mechanism sampled from a distribution over truthful mechanisms). Chen \emph{et al.}~\cite{chen} improve this result by providing a 7.91-approximate mechanism, and show a corresponding lower bound of $2$ among universally truthful mechanisms for submodular maximization. |
