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authorThibaut Horel <thibaut.horel@gmail.com>2014-11-02 18:25:59 -0500
committerThibaut Horel <thibaut.horel@gmail.com>2014-11-02 18:25:59 -0500
commitb3ec93577ce7835379d31c36f6518848c75c4718 (patch)
tree0af32d72ad4c6d476693a6d2e8fc7053d6898225
parenteb3fed8f0f1b3d954b5ba26f397ab1541df04f7b (diff)
downloadecon2099-b3ec93577ce7835379d31c36f6518848c75c4718.tar.gz
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@@ -90,8 +90,6 @@ behavior of the agents: during the auction they are maximizing a different
utility function (biased by the probability of winning); this might decrease
their true utility.
-\end{itemize}
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\section{Relevant Prior Work} We are planning to consider prior work on first-price auctions where the bidders have multiple rounds of bidding over time, and various mechanisms that can capture this idea. One inspiration comes from the \lq\lq bid-your-utility \rq\rq auction described in the following paper: Hoy, D., Jain, K., \& Wilkens, C. A. (2013, June). A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions. In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce (pp. 583-584). ACM.
\end{document}