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diff --git a/project/main.tex b/project/main.tex index a0c58a6..c921c1e 100644 --- a/project/main.tex +++ b/project/main.tex @@ -90,8 +90,6 @@ behavior of the agents: during the auction they are maximizing a different utility function (biased by the probability of winning); this might decrease their true utility. -\end{itemize} - \section{Relevant Prior Work} We are planning to consider prior work on first-price auctions where the bidders have multiple rounds of bidding over time, and various mechanisms that can capture this idea. One inspiration comes from the \lq\lq bid-your-utility \rq\rq auction described in the following paper: Hoy, D., Jain, K., \& Wilkens, C. A. (2013, June). A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions. In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce (pp. 583-584). ACM. \end{document} |