End

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/project/main.tex b/project/main.tex
index c921c1e..586be36 100644
--- a/project/main.tex
+++ b/project/main.tex
@@ -67,14 +67,14 @@ make some assumptions on the behaviors of the agents. Finding the right
 behavioral axioms is part of the project, but we list a few natural candidates
 that we are planning to consider:
 \begin{itemize}
-    \item each bidder not only has a utility function that expresses his utility at the
-        end of the auction, but also maintains a distribution on the
-        probability of being allocated.
+    \item each bidder not only has a utility function that expresses her
+        utility at the end of the auction, but also maintains a distribution on
+        the probability of being allocated.
     \item at each time step, the bidders update their distribution based on
         what has been observed at the previous step. Hence the bidders'
-        distribution are a function of the past history up to this point.
+        distributions are a function of the past history up to this point.
     \item at each time step, if a bidder is not currently winning, she is
-        willing to sacrifice some expected utility to increase their
+        willing to sacrifice some expected utility to increase her
         probability of being allocated. That is, the agents' are not fully
         rational with respect to their ``outside-the-auction utility'': while
         the auction is still running, the utility function that they are
@@ -92,4 +92,5 @@ their true utility.
 
 \section{Relevant Prior Work} We are planning to consider prior work on first-price auctions where the bidders have multiple rounds of bidding over time, and various mechanisms that can capture this idea. One inspiration comes from the \lq\lq bid-your-utility \rq\rq auction described in the following paper: Hoy, D., Jain, K., \& Wilkens, C. A. (2013, June). A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions. In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce (pp. 583-584). ACM.
 
+We were also planning to get inspiration from the deffered-acceptance mechanism in relation to the ascending-clock auction from the paper P. Duetting, V. Gkatzelis, and T. Roughgarden, The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions. In  EC '14. 
 \end{document}