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| author | Paul <Paul@Pauls-MacBook-Air.local> | 2015-05-12 13:59:20 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul <Paul@Pauls-MacBook-Air.local> | 2015-05-12 13:59:20 -0400 |
| commit | efae42726c01a2c60a9442b15fab85cca8e0f31a (patch) | |
| tree | 1d1966a6b7bf9c26542dcf4992ac337314aaebfb /final/main.tex | |
| parent | 5f2f26abf7b9c74cdddd138410f12641c366ecf1 (diff) | |
| download | econ2099-efae42726c01a2c60a9442b15fab85cca8e0f31a.tar.gz | |
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| -rw-r--r-- | final/main.tex | 2 |
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diff --git a/final/main.tex b/final/main.tex index 4bfff6e..a27f751 100644 --- a/final/main.tex +++ b/final/main.tex @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ single-item auction (see \citep{hartline}, Chapter 3). In particular, if the type of the agent (her value) is drawn from a regular distribution, the optimal mechanism which serves the agent with ex-ante allocation probability $\hat{x}$ has revenue $\Rev(\hat{x},F)$, given by solving \begin{align*} -\max_{(x,p)} p(1-F(p)) \\ +\max_{p} p(1-F(p)) \\ \text{subject to }& 1 - F(p) \leq \hat{x} \end{align*} |